Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback

arXiv:2506.03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match. Specifically, we consider a setting in which matched agents engage in zero-sum games with initially unknown payoff matrices, and we investigate whether a centralized procedure can learn an equilibrium from bandit feedback. We adopt the solution concept of a matching equilibrium, where a matching \( \mathfrak{m} \) and a set of agent strategies \( X \) form an equilibrium if no agent has an incentive to deviate from \( (\mathfrak{m}, X) \). To quantify deviations of a candidate solution \( (\mathfrak{m}, X) \) from the equilibrium \( (\mathfrak{m}^\star, X^\star) \), we introduce the notion of matching instability, which serves as a regret measure for the learning problem. We propose a UCB-based algorithm in which agents form preferences and select actions according to optimistic estimates of the payoffs. Our analysis establishes a sublinear, instance-independent regret upper bound, further supported by empirical evidence.