arXiv (CS.AI)
2026-06-17
DOI: arXiv:2606.17555
arXiv:2606.17555v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Banks simultaneously face signature-based fraud (card-not-present attacks, account takeover, ATM cloning) and behavioural financial crime (structuring, layering, mule networks, business email compromise) – two threat families with fundamentally different detection requirements. Static rule engines that reliably catch brute-force and high-velocity events are structurally blind to business-email-compromise (BEC) payment redirection, session hijacking, and money-laundering layering, which are engineered to appear indistinguishable from legitimate activity at the individual transaction or session level. This paper presents an AI security agent for retail and corporate banking that addresses this gap through a three-component fusion architecture operating on two parallel event streams: a transaction stream (card fraud, ACH/wire fraud, AML categories) and a session stream (account takeover, session hijacking, SIM-swap, insider abuse). Each stream combines an LSTM sequence model capturing per-account behavioural history, a statistical velocity/threshold monitor, and a graph/network module capturing account-counterparty relationship patterns (fan-in, fan-out, pass-through ratio) for money-laundering detection. Experiments on a synthetic event log of 237,669 transactions and 113,508 sessions across 13 threat categories and 3,470 simulated accounts demonstrate overall F1 of 0.787 (transaction stream) and 0.867 (session stream) for the proposed model, versus 0.562/0.733 for a rule-based baseline and 0.655/0.713 for an LSTM-only baseline. The agent includes a customer-facing transaction-verification chatbot (96.6% identity verification accuracy, 86.8% mass-reset attack detection) and an analyst case-summary assistant (99.3% action-recommendation F1), with Critical-tier automated response latency under 0.43 ms at the 95th percentile.