SEVRA-BENCH: Social Engineering of Vulnerabilities in Review Agents
arXiv:2606.13757v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) reviewers are increasingly used in pull-request (PR) workflows, where their approvals help decide which code is merged into a repository. This raises a question that benchmarks for static vulnerability detection or code generation do not address: can an automated reviewer reject a malicious contribution when the attacker controls both the code change and the accompanying PR text? We introduce SEVRA-BENCH (Social Engineering of Vulnerabilities in Review Agents), a benchmark that measures how often an automated reviewer approves such adversarial pull requests. Each malicious PR in SEVRA-BENCH is built from a real project commit that previously fixed a vulnerability listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. We automatically invert that fix to restore the original vulnerable code and submit it as a pull request wrapped in one of 15 social-engineering framings, which vary the claims made, the supporting evidence, the urgency conveyed, signals of prior approval, and appeals to authority. SEVRA-BENCH contains 1,062 malicious PRs drawn from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)-linked fixes across the top 10 entries of the 2025 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Top 25. In a realistic setting, we evaluate 8 current LLMs as code review agents on PRs that introduce vulnerabilities previously reported in public disclosures. Our results reveal a sharp gap in security capabilities between closed- and open-source models. We hope SEVRA-BENCH will serve as a valuable resource for advancing open-source models and narrowing this gap.