Legal Reasoning Is Not Lawyering: Rethinking Legal Benchmarks for Pro Se Access to Justice
arXiv:2606.23716v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Legal AI benchmark research frequently invokes the assumption that large language models can improve access to justice, including for people who cannot access lawyers in order to understand and exercise their legal rights. We argue that current benchmarks are not equipped to support this assumption because they evaluate legal reasoning over inputs that have already been preprocessed by legal experts, which measures the upper bound of model performance. Access to justice depends on a lower bound: how models perform when inputs come from pro se litigants, whose prompts may contain noisy narratives, buried facts, omissions, folk-legal assumptions, and surface-level errors. These degradations are comparable to conditions under which LLMs are known to degrade in the general machine learning literature, including long-context sensitivity, underspecification, hallucination, and typographical perturbations. We connect evidence from pro se literature with this body of machine learning research and present a small perturbation experiment on LEXam, a legal benchmark, to illustrate the gap between these two bounds. If model development continues to focus on benchmarks that measure only the upper bound, this gap may remain hidden or even widen. We conclude by calling for legal benchmarks that directly measure robustness under pro se-like inputs so that access-to-justice claims about legal AI can become empirically testable.