探索全球前沿学术脉络

Layerwise Terminal Discrepancy in Chen's Reverse-Heat Coupling on the Boolean Cube

arXiv:2606.04573v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recently, Chen [Chen2026] proved that Talagrand's Boolean convolution conjecture holds up to the dimension-free factor \((\log\log\eta)^{3/2}\), namely for every fixed \(\tau>0\), \[ \mu\{P_\tau f>\eta\|f\|_1\} \le C_\tau \frac{(\log\log\eta)^{3/2}}{\eta\sqrt{\log\eta}}, \qquad \eta>e^3. \] We revisit the terminal testing-discrepancy step in Chen's perturbed reverse-heat coupling. Chen estimates this discrepancy globally in terms of the remaining gap to the terminal level. We keep the same coupling and the same reverse-heat formulations, but localize the terminal discrepancy on each remaining-gap layer before summing the layers. This changes the fixed-time anti-concentration cost from order \((\log L)^{3/2}/\sqrt L\) to order \((\log L)/\sqrt L\), where \(L=\log\eta\). Consequently, we obtain a \((\log\log\eta)^{1/2}\) improvement as \[ \mu\{P_\tau f>\eta\|f\|_1\} \le C_\tau \frac{\log\log\eta}{\eta\sqrt{\log\eta}}, \qquad \eta>e^3. \]

Efficient, Robust, and Anti-Collusion Fingerprinting of Image Diffusion Models

Model fingerprinting, embedding user-specific identifiers (fingerprints) into generated outputs, has recently emerged as a popular solution to protect the intellectual property rights (IPR) of generative text-to-image (T2I) models and prevent unauthorized redistribution. In this work, we reveal a previously unexplored systematic vulnerability in existing generative model fingerprinting methods: they lack robustness against collusion attacks, where multiple attackers combine their models to remove or obscure the fingerprints. To address this issue, we take the first step towards a robust fingerprinting method for T2I models with anti-collusion capabilities. The proposed method encodes strings of bits, namely fingerprints, into the coefficients of a personalized normalization module (PNM) incorporated into T2I models, so that fingerprints can be reliably recovered from any generated image. To defend against collusion attacks and prevent unauthorized model redistribution, we introduce an anti-collusion mechanism based on lossless function-invariant parameter transformations. This mechanism significantly degrades the image generation quality of colluded models, making them effectively unusable. Moreover, our method allows developers to efficiently create multiple copies of fingerprinted T2I models by reparameterizing the PNM without the need for retraining. We also introduce a worst-case optimization strategy to improve robustness against model-level attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed method achieves high fidelity and robustness across multiple T2I image generation and editing tasks, with fingerprint extraction accuracy exceeding 99.5%. Compared with existing methods, our method demonstrates, for the first time, a notable proactive robustness to collusion attacks by significantly increasing the FID of colluded models.

Universality for Products of Random Matrices with i.i.d. Entries and the Fuss–Catalan Number

arXiv:2606.14450v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Let \((w_{ij})_{i,j\ge1}\) be a single infinite array of independent identically distributed real- or complex-valued entries of mean zero, variance \(\sigma^2\), and finite fourth moment. Set \(W_n=(w_{ij})_{1\le i,j\le n}\) and \(X_n=n^{-1/2}W_n\). For every fixed \(k\ge1\), we identify the almost sure limiting operator norm of several fixed products built from this family. Define the \(k\)-th freeness coefficient by \[ \gamma_k:=\sqrt{\frac{(k+1)^{k+1}}{k^k}}. \] Then we prove \[ \|X_n^k\|\to\sigma^k\gamma_k \qquad almost surely. \] The same limit holds for products sampled with replacement from any fixed finite pool of independent copies of \(X_n\); in particular, it holds for the product of \(k\) independent copies. Thus, the freeness coefficient captures the non-commuting characteristic between large random matrices %powers and independent or fixed-pool sampled products under the finite fourth moment assumption. The improvement of the classical Bai–Yin-type power estimate from the scale \(\sigma^k(k{+}1)\) to \(\sigma^k \sqrt{k{+}1}\) is a direct corollary of our result. The main technical challenge is to prove the upper bound using a high-moment expansion of %the upper bound is proved by a high-moment expansion of \(\E\Tr((X_n^kX_n^{*k})^m)\). The leading zero-defect trace words are tree-like and are counted by the Fuss–Catalan number \[ F_{k,m}= \frac1{km+1}\binom{(k+1)m}{m}. \] The combinatorial tool helps to devise a defect-sensitive global enumeration: if \(L=km\) and \[ r=(L+1-v)+(L-q), \] then the number of admissible word classes with defect \(r\) is at most \(F_{k,m}(Cm)^{Dr}\). This polynomial-in-\(m\) loss, with degree proportional to the defect, is summable in the logarithmic moment range.