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SkillsBench: Benchmarking How Well Agent Skills Work Across Diverse Tasks

arXiv:2602.12670v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agent Skills are structured packages of procedural knowledge that augment large language model (LLM) agents at inference time. Despite rapid adoption, there is no standard way to measure whether they actually help. We present SkillsBench, a benchmark whose current inventory contains 87 tasks across 8 domains paired with curated Skills and deterministic verifiers. Our latest aggregate evaluation runs the 87-task benchmark under matched no-Skills and curated-Skills conditions for 18 model-harness configurations. Curated Skills raise the average pass rate from 33.9% to 50.5% (+16.6 percentage points; 25.5% normalized gain), with configuration-level gains ranging from +4.1 to +25.7 pp. Focused Skills with at most three modules outperform larger or exhaustive bundles, and smaller models with Skills can match larger models without them. SkillsBench establishes paired evaluation as the foundation for rigorous measurement of Skill efficacy on agentic, expertise-heavy work.

From Prompts to Responses: Dual-Sided Data Leakage and Defense in Split Large Language Models

arXiv:2606.14210v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in privacy-sensitive domains, where users must balance the risk of data exposure through external APIs against the high computational cost of local deployment. Split learning has therefore emerged as a promising paradigm for LLM fine-tuning and inference under limited local resources. However, it introduces new privacy risks. Prior work primarily studies leakage of private input prompts, typically via inversion attacks on intermediate representations, while the potential for sensitive information leakage through generative response outputs remains largely unexplored. In this work, we unveil novel vulnerabilities of Split-LLM by presenting Patched Model Inversion with Dual-Sided Initialization (PIDI), a two-stage attack that simultaneously targets both private input prompts and output responses in Split-LLM settings. It combines dual-sided initialization with a patched inversion strategy to tackle long sequences, substantially outperforming prior inversion methods. To counter threats from both sides, we further propose the Adapter-based DualGuard with Mutual Information Defense (ADMI), which integrates an adapter-based local warmup strategy and mutual information regularization to provide a strong empirical privacy protection with minimal impact on task performance. Extensive experiments across diverse tasks and models demonstrate that ADMI effectively defends against PIDI and other state-of-the-art inversion attacks. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/FLAIR-THU/VFLAIR-LLM.

Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners

Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based systems. Through an empirical study of existing skill scanners, we find that current defenses primarily rely on textual descriptions, manifests, and source code as the main signals for security analysis, which can leave visually conveyed malicious intent insufficiently examined. This creates a practical blind spot: harmful operational instructions hidden in images may bypass scanning while still being recoverable by multimodal agents during deployment. To systematically investigate this threat, we propose SkillCamo, a document-mediated multimodal instruction attack that conceals malicious instructions within images bundled with a skill while rewriting the surrounding documentation to naturally reference those images as part of the normal workflow. Thus, the attack does not rely on the image alone, but on the joint interpretation of textual guidance and visual payload at execution time. To defend against such attacks, we further propose ExecScan, an execution-grounded multimodal scanning module that performs intent extraction, behavior reconstruction, abuse assessment, and deliberative execution simulation over skill artifacts. ExecScan jointly analyzes documentation, code, referenced resources, and visual content to recover hidden instructions, reconstruct executable behavior chains, and identify downstream risks such as exfiltration, destruction, persistence, deception, and privilege escalation. Extensive experiments show that image-hidden malicious instructions challenge existing skill scanners, while ExecScan can improve the skill scanning performance.