探索全球前沿学术脉络

Boosting Knowledge Graph Foundation Models via Enhanced Negative Sampling

arXiv:2605.27023v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Knowledge graphs (KGs) have become the core backbone of numerous downstream tasks such as question answering and recommender systems. However, despite all this, KGs are often very incomplete. To perform zero-shot knowledge graph completion in unseen KGs, which have different relational vocabularies from those used for pre-training, KG foundation models (KGFMs) receive a wide range of attention. Existing KGFMs often perform training using random negative triples, which are constructed by replacing the head or tail entity of a positive triple with a random entity. However, these negative triples are often constructed with limited quality, providing weak supervision for KGFM training. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective adaptive negative sampling approach, KMAS, to enhance existing KGFMs. KMAS constructs hard negative triples through the updated relation embeddings generated from the existing KGFM's relation encoder. To further adaptively align with the evolving capability of the KGFM during the training process, KMAS adjusts the ratio of hard negative triples dynamically throughout the whole training process: after a warmup phrase, it increases the ratio linearly and then decreases linearly. Extensive experiments are conducted over 44 data sets. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed negative sampling method can enhance many SOTA KGFMs without requiring excessive additional time or memory consumption.

SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents

arXiv:2602.14211v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface. A malicious or compromised skill can be repeatedly loaded as trusted guidance and steer downstream tool use. Existing skill-based prompt-injection attacks are often manual and brittle, because explicit malicious instructions are rejected or ignored when they are not aligned with the original workflow. We propose SkillJect, the first automated framework for generating poisoned skills against skill-enabled agent systems. SkillJect uses two coordinated channels. In the artifact channel, it hides the payload inside an auxiliary helper script. In the instruction channel, it rewrites SKILL.md with a front-loaded inducement strategy, placing injected content at the beginning and framing the helper script as a mandatory prerequisite or initialization step. The rewritten instruction explicitly references the helper-script path and provides an executable example command, making the helper appear to be a legitimate setup step before normal skill operations. SkillJect further adopts a closed-loop multi-agent process to improve attack effectiveness. An Attack Agent generates poisoned skills, a Victim Agent executes downstream tasks with the poisoned skill, and an Evaluate Agent inspects execution traces to determine whether the hidden payload was executed. The Attack Agent then uses this feedback to diagnose failure causes and rewrite SKILL.md, while keeping the payload fixed. Experiments across skill-enabled platforms, backend LLMs, and attack categories show that SkillJect substantially outperforms naive direct injection and prior manual skill-injection attacks, highlighting poisoned skills as a persistent threat in reusable skill ecosystems.