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Generalisable tissue-wide molecular reconstruction from histology

Spatial transcriptomics technologies measure gene expression within intact tissues but remain difficult to scale across large tissue sections and patient cohorts. Consequently, many studies rely on tissue microarrays (TMAs) or sparse spatial profiling designs, where molecular measurements are available for only limited tissue regions and are often generated using heterogeneous gene panels. Existing H&E to spatial gene expression prediction methods remain challenged by sparse molecular measurements, partially overlapping gene panels and tissue-wide reconstruction across heterogeneous spatial datasets. Here, we present GHIST+, a framework for tissue-wide reconstruction of single-cell molecular states from H&E histology. GHIST+ integrates cellular morphology, local tissue context and shared tissue representations to extend sparse molecular measurements into tissue-wide molecular maps across heterogeneous spatial datasets. Across multiple cancer types and GTEx breast tissues, GHIST+ reconstructs biologically meaningful tissue-wide molecular organisation from sparse TMA-derived measurements while preserving spatial tissue structure, cell-type organisation and age-associated tissue states across cancer and non-cancer settings. GHIST+ establishes a scalable framework for transforming sparse spatial profiling experiments into tissue-wide molecular maps, enabling cohort-scale molecular reconstruction from routine histology under heterogeneous spatial transcriptomic settings.

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

arXiv:2602.09222v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their design exposes them to indirect prompt injection attacks embedded in untrusted web content, enabling adversaries to hijack agent behavior and violate user intent. Despite growing awareness of this threat, existing evaluations rely on fixed attack templates, manually selected injection surfaces, or narrowly scoped scenarios, limiting their ability to capture realistic, adaptive attacks encountered in practice. We present MUZZLE, an automated agentic framework for evaluating the security of web agents against indirect prompt injection attacks. MUZZLE utilizes the agent's trajectories to automatically identify high-salience injection surfaces, and adaptively generate context-aware malicious instructions that target violations of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Unlike prior approaches, MUZZLE adapts its attack strategy based on the agent's observed execution trajectory and iteratively refines attacks using feedback from failed executions. We evaluate MUZZLE across diverse web applications, user tasks, and agent configurations, demonstrating its ability to automatically and adaptively assess the security of web agents with minimal human intervention. Our results show that MUZZLE effectively discovers 44 new attacks on 4 web applications with 10 adversarial objectives that violate confidentiality, availability, or privacy properties across different LLMs and agent scaffolds. MUZZLE also identifies novel attack strategies, including 3 cross-application prompt injection attacks and an agent-tailored phishing scenario.