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Authors: Manas Gaur ×
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01.
arXiv (CS.AI) 2026-06-16

NeuroSymbolic AI for Legal AI-TRISM: Trustworthy, Reliable, Interpretable, Safe Models

arXiv:2606.15646v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, but their lack of interpretable reasoning and tendency to hallucinate pose significant challenges for legal applications. While LLMs show promise for legal text analysis and generation, they struggle with accurate citation attribution and precedent verification. For example, in legal contexts, a single incorrect precedent can jeopardize a case. Current approaches to improve LLM reliability in legal domains suffer from two key limitations: inadequate integration of structured legal knowledge during training or fine-tuning, and insufficient verification mechanisms for generated legal content. To address these challenges, we propose the TRISM (Trustworthy, Reliable, Interpretable, Safe Models) framework, which integrates NeuroSymbolic AI principles with LLMs to leverage both neural learning capabilities and symbolic reasoning over structured legal knowledge. The TRISM approach addresses the above limitations while maintaining interpretable decision pathways. Our framework formalizes the extraction of symbolic knowledge from legal textual documents and incorporates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) as a core component for grounding LLM outputs in verified legal sources. In this position paper, we make the following contributions: (1) An analysis of the limitations of AI in law; (2) Introduce RASOR RAG which creates foundations for neurosymbolic RAG by generating explicit interpretable rationales that could be formalized into symbolic representations; (3) A formalized methodology for creating symbolic legal knowledge bases that support both interpretable reasoning and output verification in LLMs; and (4) The TRISM framework for integrating symbolic legal knowledge with LLMs.

02.
arXiv (CS.CL) 2026-06-18

From Concept-Aligned Tokens to Vulnerable Features: Mechanistic Localization of Jailbreaks

Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent failure mode in safety-aligned LLMs: models can be pushed into harmful behavior, but the internal representations enabling this shift remain poorly localized. Recent mechanistic safety studies often explain such behavior through broad representational objects, including global refusal directions, activation steering vectors, and refusal-related SAE features. We instead ask whether jailbreak vulnerability can be traced to finer-grained, prompt-conditioned SAE feature subgroups. We introduce a token-driven mechanistic pipeline that decomposes the residual stream of Gemma-2-2B into Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) features and identifies feature subgroups associated with unsafe behavior. Using single-category unsafe examples from BeaverTails to reduce cross-category interference, we extract harmful concepts from adversarial responses and align them with concept-relevant prompt tokens through subspace similarity. We then apply three feature-grouping strategies: cluster-based, hierarchical-linkage, and single-token-driven, to identify SAE feature subgroups across all 26 layers. Finally, we amplify the top features in each subgroup and evaluate the resulting generations with a standardized harmfulness judge. Single-token-driven grouping achieves harmfulness comparable to full cluster-based grouping, showing that individual harmful prompt tokens are sufficient to localize vulnerability-relevant SAE feature subgroups without relying on broader cluster-level aggregation. These subgroups appear across early and mid-to-late layers, with stronger concentration in mid-to-late layers, where targeted steering exposes specific model vulnerabilities. Overall, our results suggest that jailbreak susceptibility can be traced to sparse, token-localized SAE feature subgroups, complementing prior accounts based on broad adversarial, refusal, or steering directions.