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作者: Lipeng He ×
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01.
arXiv (CS.AI) 2026-06-12

OCOO-T : A Simple and Scalable Virtual Cell Model for Transcriptional Perturbation Response Prediction

arXiv:2606.12838v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Predicting single-cell transcriptional responses to genetic, chemical and cytokine perturbations is a fundamental challenge in computational biology and AI Virtual Cell (AIVC) modeling, with direct implications for drug discovery and the elucidation of gene regulatory networks. Existing approaches often rely on auxiliary cell-state encoders, hierarchical variational autoencoders, dedicated Transformer encoder-decoder modules, or gene-interaction priors to compress high-dimensional expression profiles into latent representations. While effective, these designs increase architectural complexity and may limit scalability and generalizability. This paper introduces OCOO-T, a minimalist flow-matching-based AIVC model for transcriptional perturbation response prediction. OCOO-T utilizes a vanilla Transformer stack that operates directly on continuous gene expression profiles and formulates perturbation response prediction as a continuous-time denoising process. Perturbation embeddings, dosage information, and cell-line/cell-type specificity are integrated through adaptive layer normalization and in-context tokens. Comprehensive evaluations on Tahoe100M, Replogle, and PBMC benchmarks demonstrate that OCOO-T achieves state-of-the-art performance across diverse perturbations and cell types while effectively scaling to long transcriptional profiles through patching and depatching of cellular contexts. By leveraging the simplicity of Transformer-based denoising for single-cell omics, OCOO-T provides an effective and scalable framework for in-silico cellular simulation.

02.
arXiv (CS.AI) 2026-06-16

Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment

arXiv:2606.15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense. In this work, we trace this collapse to two failure modes. First, existing defense methods are confined to recognizing specific attack patterns, rather than assessing whether the intent of every embedded instruction is relevant to the user task. Second, training-based defenses, which otherwise offer the strongest safety-utility trade-off, assemble their adversarial examples from a handful of hand-crafted templates, and the resulting defender fails to generalize outside that narrow strategy distribution. To address these gaps, we propose RETA, a training-based method that grounds defense decisions on the user tasks rather than attacker-controlled data. At each tool-output step, the defender undertakes chain-of-thought reasoning verifying that its actions are consistent with the user task. Leveraging red-teaming, a simulated attacker synthesizes adversarial training data and receives a dictionary-learning diversity reward, achieving broad coverage of injection-reformulation strategies. Together, these allow the defender to be optimized via multi-objective reinforcement learning and achieve better safety-utility trade-off. Across six black-box adaptive attacks, RETA keeps every per-attack ASR below 10%, with average ASR of 2.92% and 3.75% on the two target models, while preserving most utility under attack and on clean inputs.