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AGE-MIL: Anchor-Guided Evidence Learning for Patient-Level Prediction

Existing computational pathology methods predominantly operate within whole-slide image (WSI)-level multiple instance learning (MIL) paradigms, while patient-level modeling remains underexplored. In routine pathological practice, however, pathologists derive diagnostic and prognostic conclusions by integrating evidence across multiple WSIs rather than relying on any single slide. This discrepancy creates a fundamental misalignment when patient-level supervision is directly imposed on conventional MIL frameworks, often leading to unstable optimization and degraded predictive reliability. To address this issue, we propose Anchor-Guided Evidence MIL (AGE-MIL), a weakly supervised framework for patient-level prediction. AGE-MIL constructs a patient-level anchor from slide representations to capture global pathological context and guide the retrieval and integration of diagnostically relevant local patches, enabling robust patient-level modeling. Patient-level risk is further modeled as an evidence accumulation process, promoting stable optimization under weak supervision. AGE-MIL is evaluated on six clinically relevant patient-level prediction tasks from two independent cohorts. Experimental results show that the proposed framework consistently outperforms eight state-of-the-art MIL methods. Code is available at https://github.com/wodeniua/AGE-MIL.

Agents' Last Exam

Recent AI systems have achieved strong results on a wide range of benchmarks, yet these gains have not translated into economically meaningful deployment across many professional domains. We argue that this gap is largely an evaluation problem: widely used benchmarks lack sustained performance measurement on real and economically valuable workflows. This paper introduces Agents' Last Exam (ALE), a benchmark designed to evaluate AI agents on long horizon, economically valuable, real world tasks with verifiable outcomes. Developed in collaboration with 250+ industry experts, ALE covers non-physical industries defined with reference to O*NET / SOC 2018 (the U.S. federal occupational taxonomy). It is organized around a task taxonomy with 55 sub fields grouped into 13 industry clusters covering 1K+ tasks. Current results show that the hardest tier remains far from saturated: across mainstream harness and backbone configurations, the average full pass rate is below 1%. ALE is designed as a living benchmark: its task pool grows continuously as new workflows and industries are onboarded. More broadly, ALE is intended not merely as another leaderboard, but as an instrument for closing the gap between benchmark success and GDP relevant impact.

No Hidden Prompts Needed! You Can Game AI Peer Review with Presentation-Only Revisions

As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.