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Longitudinal multi-omics characterization of the malignant evolution in multirelapsing glioblastoma

Linking glioblastoma (GBM) evolution to clinical progression is challenged by multiple factors, including tumor location for repeated sample collection, and short patient survival. In a single individual, we collected and analysed samples from 11 operations distributed across 31 months of multi-relapsing and multifocal GBM, including terminal leptomeningeal progression. All samples shared genomic ancestry of the retinoblastoma protein 1 (RB1) and neurofibromin 1 (NF1) mutations while advanced progression and extracranial metastases featured mutations of tuberous sclerosis complex 2 (TSC2), PBRM1, CD22 and Fanconi anemia supplementation group I (FANCI), correlated with clinical resistance to immunotherapies and DNA-damaging agents. Single-cell analytics revealed distinct yet reversible shifts in response to the precision medicine arsenal. GBM parenchymal dissemination and extracranial progression were associated with strengthening of neuron-like cell phenotypes. Our multidimensional study describes GBM evolution over a rarely reported time scale, and provides a valuable resource linking genetic, molecular, cellular and clinical progressions.

FloatDoor: Platform-Triggered Backdoors in LLMs

arXiv:2606.19535v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive settings such as software engineering, where their outputs directly shape downstream artifacts. Recent work has shown that an identical model can produce measurably different outputs depending on the deployment platform, a consequence of non-associative floating-point arithmetic and divergent kernel implementations. We study the security implications of this platform-dependent variability and uncover a novel attack surface on LLM deployments. We introduce FloatDoor, the first input-independent, platform-triggered backdoor attack against generative LLMs. The compromised model exhibits adversary-chosen behavior when served on a target platform and is otherwise benign. FloatDoor is realized through two lightweight LoRA adapters, one that amplifies inter-platform numerical divergence and one that binds the resulting platform signature to a malicious downstream task, while leaving aggregate model utility largely intact. FloatDoor exploits a pronounced time-of-check, time-of-use gap between model auditing and serving. We demonstrate FloatDoor on Qwen3-4B across a broad range of deployment targets, including NVIDIA GPUs, Google TPUs, AWS Graviton, and Alibaba Yitian-710. As a final case study, we show that FloatDoor reliably induces exploitable code vulnerabilities on a chosen target platform. Our results establish a new class of attacks on LLM deployments and underscore the pressing need for trusted model supply chains in sensitive, LLM-powered applications.